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Abstract: 
This paper analyses the monetary consequences of the Latin-American trade integration process. We 
consider a sample of five countries –Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay- spanning the 
period 1991-2007. The main question raised pertains to the feasibility of a monetary union between 
L.A. economies. To this end, we study whether this set of countries is characterized by business cycle 
synchronization with the occurrence of common shocks, a strong similarity in the adjustment process 
and the convergence of policy responses. We focus especially our attention on two points. First, we try 
to determine to what extent international disturbances influence the domestic business cycles through 
trade and/or financial channels. Second, we analyze the impact of the adoption of different exchange 
rate regimes on the countries’ responses to shocks. All these features are the main issues in the 
literature relative to regional integration and OCA process. 
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1. Introduction 
The 1990s were characterized by an intensification of Regional Trade Agreements in the 
Americas. The main agreements are the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR) –signed in 
1991 between Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay (and more recently Venezuela), with 
Bolivia, Chili, Peru, Colombia, and Equator as associates- and the North American Free Trade 
Area (NAFTA) –signed in 1994 between Canada, Mexico and the United States with more 
and more agreements with other Latin American countries (LACs) (Chili, Peru, Equator…)1. 
Since 1994, a Free Trade Area Agreement for the Americas has been discussed, as an 
extension of the NAFTA. In the spirit of Eichengreen and Taylor (2004), this paper analyses 
the monetary consequences of this trade integration process. We consider a sample of five 
countries –Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay- that account for some 70 per cent 
of the region’s GDP spanning the period 1991-Q1 – 2007-Q1. The paper assembles a 
quarterly dataset (see Appendix 1 for data sources) including both main international 
macroeconomic variables –such as the GDP of the Group of seven countries and the world 
commodities prices index- and main domestic variables –such as GDP ant real exchange 
rates. In addition, we consider variables based on the literature dedicated to the sudden stop 
problem (Calvo et al., 2004): the Emerging Economy spread index and the foreign exchange 
reserves. 
The main question raised in this paper refers to the feasibility of a monetary union between 
these countries. To this end, we study whether this set of countries is characterized by 
business cycle synchronization with the occurrence of common shocks, a strong similarity in 
the adjustment process and the convergence of policy responses. We focus especially our 
attention on two points. First, we try to determine to what extent international disturbances 
influence the domestic business cycles through trade and/or financial channels. Second, we 
analyze the impact of the adoption of different exchange rate regimes on the countries’ 
responses to shocks. As showed in appendix 2, studied countries adopted very different 
exchange rate regimes over the 1991-2007 period. While at the beginning, the set of countries 
ranges from hard peg (Argentine currency board) to intermediate regimes, at the end, it 
exhibits a clear switch toward floating regimes. 
The present paper is linked to two separate strands of literature. The first one, dedicated to the 
debate of monetary union versus dollarization, includes numerous papers analyzing the 
                                                 
1. We can also mention the CARICOM (Caribbean Community and Common Market, 1973), the CACM (Centre 
America Common Market, 1960), CAN (Andean Community, 1969) 
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situation of Central and Latin American countries relative to the United States2. Empirical 
studies suggest that dollarization is not an obvious solution, even for Mexico. For instance, 
Karas (2003) finds that Mexican output fluctuations have been negatively correlated with the 
American fluctuations. According to Hallwood et al (2006), Brazilian, Chilean and 
Uruguayan permanent shocks are correlated with Argentina suggesting that monetary union 
could be a better solution than dollarization. The second strand of literature analyses the 
sources of business cycles fluctuations in emerging countries. Two lessons from this literature 
are especially interesting for our purpose. On the one hand, a large body of studies suggests 
that the main source of fluctuations originated from external factors. Aiolfi et al (2006) –
considering a sample of four LACs3- identify the presence of a common regional factor. 
Taking into account the weak intra-regional trade integration, this result suggests that the 
regional business cycle (major turning points are common to the four countries) is driven by 
external variables and common external shocks. On the other hand, the financial channel –
based on international interest rates for instance- seem more significant than the trade channel 
in understanding the influence of external shocks on domestic business cycle fluctuations in 
LACs4. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains the methodology 
adopted in this paper and founded on Bayesian structural VAR models. Section 3 presents the 
macroeconomic variables included in the VAR, the results and the policy implications. 
Section 4 concludes. 
2. Methodology of the Study  
This paper rests on two important methodological points: on the one hand, we propose a way 
to take into account the structural breaks affecting LACs over the period and, on the other 
hand, we use a Bayesian structural VAR. 
2.1. Non-Stationarity and Structural Breaks: the Special Case of Emerging Economies  
The emerging economies case –and more especially LACs- is not the simplest one to use 
times series methodology. Indeed, this group of countries exhibits numerous structural breaks 
–e.g. the end of hyperinflation and the dramatic increase in commodities prices after 2000- 
and/or changes in policy regimes such as the exchange rate regimes collapses that result in 
                                                 
2. See for instance Salvatore (2001), Corbo (2001), Alesina et al. (2003), Karas (2003), Larrain and Tavares 
(2003), Hallwood et al. (2006), and Allegret and Sand-Zantman (2007 and 2008). 
3. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Mexico over the period 1870-2004. See also Canova (2005) and Maćkowiak 
(2007). 
4. See Ahmed (2003), Canova (2005), and Ősterholm and Zettelmeyer (2007). 
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new monetary policy frameworks. Since the seminal works of Nelson and Plosser (1982), 
most macroeconomic time series in level are considered unit root process. On the same 
sample than Nelson and Plosser, Perron (1989) challenged this interpretation, indicating that 
most macroeconomic variables are trend stationary, coupled with structural breaks. Looking 
at the Latin-American macroeconomic time series, we assert the same hypothesis: the 
econometricians had to take into account structural breaks due to non random external and 
internal shocks and change of policy regimes. The right way to deal with this question 
consists (in the Perron procedure) to test for unit roots in the presence of structural change at 
known date. If the date of the break is uncertain, other tests are available (Vogelsang and 
Perron, 1998, or Zivot and Andrews, 2002) on common softwares. However, as shown in Le 
Bihan (2004) all these procedures are powerless when the number and the date of the break 
are unknown. Overall, the combination of a short sample and multiple breaks weaken the 
break diagnosis compared to the following unit root test.  
We choose a rougher but probably more securing method. First we identified the noticeable 
breaks of the figures5 as being the well-known historical ones (due for instance to balance of 
payments crisis, or switches of policy regime): the results are displayed in Appendix 3. As 
particular (and generally deterministic) events, these breaks can hardly be considered as the 
N.I.D. stochastic innovations of a random walk. Second, in order to stationarize the 
macroeconomic series, we clean them from the various deterministic trends and intercept 
leaps, using simply time trends and dummy variables. We finish with a common A.D.F. test, 
finding all series stationary. Thus, we can exclude any cointegration relationship but a VAR 
in level is an available alternative to the VECM one; so we choose a recursive semi-structural 
approach for a VAR in level of the detrended series. 
2.2. A Bayesian Structural VAR 
Undeniably, the sample is short and the number of variables fairly high. In this case, 
Litterman (1979, 1984) suggests specifying blurred restrictions on the mean and variance of 
the coefficients instead of brutal “ad hoc” exclusions. As Doan (2007) concludes, “in a vector 
autoregression, we must concern ourselves not only with the lags of the dependent variables, 
but also with the lags of the other endogenous variables. Because of the stability conditions, 
we have some pretty good information about the size of lag coefficients in a simple 
autoregression. However, it’s not so clear what the sizes of the coefficients on the other 
variables should be, and these depend, in part, on the relative scales of the variables 
                                                 
5. To this end, we use Chow tests. 
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involved”. As indicated by Canova (2007), priors on the mean and variance of the variable 
allow dealing with over parametrization. 
The choice of priors is the simplest one: overweighting the first lags of endogenous variables 
of each equation. Although a fine tuning prior is unrealistic, a deeper investigation must allow 
a better assessment of the consequences of innovations but it could be time-wasting. 
In the same way, this version uses a semi structural BVAR. Using a Bayesian justifies once 
more avoiding a structural orthogonalization: Canova (2007) shows that the combination of 
Bayesian methods and structural hypothesis is not the simplest one, particularly for economies 
characterised by a succession of policy regimes. 
3. The Model and the Results 
3.1. Variables selection 
Our variables are based on the traditional one for VARs analyzing external shocks and 
macroeconomic packages in open economies and on the literature dedicated to the sudden 
stop problem. 
Each domestic VAR includes three external variables. As real external shocks, we consider (i) 
the Gross Domestic Product for the G7 (noted LGDPG7) and (ii) the world commodities 
prices excluding oil (noted WCPNO). Our choice to exclude oil from our commodities prices 
index is due to the fact that some LACs (for instance Brazil and Mexico) are both producers 
and consumers of oil. 
The Emerging Economy spread index of J.P. Morgan (EMBI)6 accounts for the international 
financial shock. Many studies chose US interest rates or international interest rates –such as 
LIBOR- to estimate the impact of external financial shocks on emerging markets. We prefer 
to use the EMBI in order to disentangle monetary policy shocks and financial shocks. Further, 
over our sample period, the EMBI does not seem significantly influenced by LIBOR, 
confirming the González-Rozada and Levy-Yeyati (2005) results which show that spreads are 
determined by global factors7. Uribe and Yue (2006) analyze the respective influence of US 
                                                 
6 We merged two time series: the EMBI for the period 1991Q1-1997Q4 and the EMBI+ from 1998Q1. As 
indicated in Cunningham (1999), the main differences between these indices are (i) the number of financial 
instruments embodied (the EMBI tracks returns and spreads on Brady Bonds and some other restructured 
sovereign debts, the EMBI+ tracks returns on a wider range of instruments), (ii) the number of countries (11 for 
the EMBI, 16 for the EMBI+). However, in both indices the weight of the LAC is very important (respectively 
83.8% and 70.2%). Amongst the LAC, both Argentina and Brazil account for 47.6% of the EMBI+. In 1999, 
J.P.Morgan released a new index, the EMBIG (for “global”) embodying more countries (27) and more titles. In 
this last index, LAC decreased to 61.5%.  
7. We perform different experiments in our VARs: first, we include both LIBOR and EMBI; second, we include 
only LIBOR. Results do not significantly change. Granger causality tests do not exhibit relations between EMBI 
and LIBOR. 
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interest rates and EMBI shocks on the macroeconomic fluctuations in a sample of seven 
emerging countries covering the period 1994-2001. An important finding is that EMBI shocks 
exacerbate the US interest rate shocks, implying a strong macroeconomic volatility in the 
studied emerging countries. 
For the domestic variables, we took the foreign reserves (FOREX) as proxy for the balance of 
payments, the gross domestic product (GDP), the consumption prices index (CPI), the 
nominal money market interest rate (R) and the real effective exchange rate8 (ER). 
Calvo et al. (2004) stress that sudden stop episodes are characterized by both international 
reserves losses and sharp current account reversals. The former increases the country 
vulnerability to shocks while the latter leads to output and employment contractions. Balance 
of payments quarterly data are not reliable and subject to sizable revisions. As a result, our 
VARs does not include current account data. As a proxy for sudden stop problems, we chose 
to include central bank’s foreign exchange reserves. In order to test the robustness of the 
results, we substitute the deseasonalized exports-imports ratio to FOREX. This ratio 
represents a proxy for the intertemporal constraint of the current account: a decrease in capital 
inflows imposes the reduction of absorption in order to increase exports and decrease imports. 
Interestingly, the results do not change significantly. As a result, we prefer to consider only 
the FOREX variables in order to avoid some interpretation difficulties owing to the fact that 
the ratio obeys in part to competitive factors, and not exclusively to financial factors. 
3.2. The Model 
The model is tested separately for each LAC. The number of lags –two in each model- has 
been selected using the common set of criteria and tests. As the inverse roots of the AR 
polynomial lie in the unit circle, VARs satisfy the stability condition. 
The following order of Choleski factorization is deduced from our theoretical interpretation of 
the contemporary correlation matrix of the reduced form residuals of each country model and 
from block exogeneity Wald tests. 
                                                 
8. An increase (decrease) in the real exchange rate means real depreciation (appreciation). 
 6
1(1,1) 1(1,8)
1( , )
1(8,1) 1(8,8)
_ 7( ) _ 7(
_ ( )
_ ( )
_ _ ( )
_ _ ( )
_ _ ( )
_ _ ( )
_ _ ( )
i j
C CCYC LGDPG t CYC GDPG t
CYC LWCPNO t
CYC EMBI t
CCYC Li GDP t
CYC Li CPI t
CYC Li FOREX t
CYC i R t
C CCYC Li ER t
−⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ + ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
2(1,1) 2(1,8)
2( , )
2(8,1) 2(8,8)
1)
_ ( 1)
_ ( 1)
_ _ ( 1)
_ _ ( 1)
_ _ ( 1)
_ _ ( 1)
_ _ ( 1)
         i j
CYC LWCPNO t
CYC EMBI t
CYC Li GDP t
CYC Li CPI t
CYC Li FOREX t
CYC i R t
CYC Li ER t
C C
C
C C
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟ +⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
_ 7
_
_
_ _
_ _
_
_ 7( 2)
_ ( 2)
_ ( 2)
_ _ ( 2)
_ _ ( 2)
_ _ ( 2)
_ _ ( 2)
_ _ ( 2)
CYC LGDPG
CYC LWCPNO
CYC EMBI
CYC Li GDP
CTC Li CPI
CYC
eCYC GDPG t
eCYC LWCPNO t
eCYC EMBI t
eCYC Li GDP t
CYC Li CPI t e
CYC Li FOREX t e
CYC i R t
CYC Li ER t
−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟ +⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠
_
_ _
_ _
Li FOREX
CYC i R
CYC Li ER
e
e
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
with = A for Argentina, B for Brazil, C for Chile, M for Mexico, and U for Uruguay. 
External variables are considered as the most exogenous. We assume that real external 
variables are predetermined relative to external financial ones. In addition, we consider that 
the GDP of the G7 countries exerts an influence on commodities prices through a demand 
effect. For domestic variables, different plausible orders have been experimented. They do not 
significantly change results. 
3.3. Econometric findings 
Using this framework, we combine the impulse response functions (tracing out the time paths 
of the effects of pure shocks on the set of variables, see Appendix 4), and the forecast error 
variance decomposition (indicating the proportion of the movements in a sequence due to its 
own shocks versus to the other variables, see Appendix 5). This allows us to assess the degree 
of similarities in the reactions of macroeconomic variables to shocks amongst the set of 
countries. At the same time, we get a first outline of the specific -versus common- economic 
consequences of shocks in terms of spontaneous adjustments, as well as in terms of policy 
responses9. 
Responses of domestic variables to external shocks: is transmission real or financial? 
In all studied countries, GDP fluctuations are significantly influenced by foreign variables. 
Our results show that in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile foreign variables explain at least 29% of 
the GDP variance decompositions after 16 quarters. In Mexico and Uruguay, the shares are 
16.1% and 20% respectively. Above all, no domestic variables –except GDP themselves- 
exert a higher influence than foreign innovations in all countries. 
As expected, GDP increases after a shock on GDPG7. The positive influence of GDPG7 
means that improvement (vs degradation) of the business cycle in G7 countries can result in 
                                                 
9. All results mentioned in the text but not displayed are available upon request to the authors. 
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an increase (vs slowdown) of growth in LACs. The weak influence of GDPG7 is Brazil rests 
on the fact that this economy is a closed economy relatively to other studied countries. 
In all countries except Uruguay, GDP increases after a shock on commodities prices 
(WCPNO) confirming the importance of commodities in LACs’ business cycles. Not only 
contemporaneous responses are significant and positive but we also observe significant 
persistent effects. 
A large body of empirical literature dedicated to business cycle in LACs stresses that growth 
in these economies follows international capital flows. More precisely, these studies suggest 
that the behavior of capital inflows is pro-cyclical: they tend to increase when growth in 
LACs improves. As a result, we can expect a significant influence of EMBI shocks on GDP 
during the period on our sample of countries. We find that GDP decreases after a shock on 
EMBI. The magnitude of the GDP response is important in Argentina and Uruguay, and to a 
lesser extent in Mexico. The Chilean case is particularly interesting. While Chilean spread 
stayed substantially below EMBI+ or Latin American spread over the period, its GDP 
responds negatively to EMBI shock. Even if the response is weakly significant from a 
statistical point of view, this result suggests that this type of shock is global, i.e. affects all 
countries, even economies beneficing from low idiosyncratic risk premium. 
Our findings confirm Allegret and Sand-Zantman (2008) about the specific sensitivity of 
Argentina to EMBI shock. During the first half of the 90s, Argentina was one of the main 
borrowers in international capital markets enjoying very favorable financing conditions, while 
in the second half of the decade the economy suffered from a sudden-stop of capital inflows. 
In addition, the monetary policy constraints due to the currency board limited the ability of 
authorities to react in the face of EMBI shocks, inducing strong and ample macroeconomic 
variability. 
Overall, LACs differ according to the respective influence of trade and financial channels. 
Two groups of countries can thus be distinguished: a first one, including Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico in which trade channels predominate and a second group, composed of Argentina and 
Uruguay where the financial channels exert the main influence on GDP variances. In addition, 
as suggested by the Chilean experience, international financial shocks have a global nature. 
The relevance of the sudden stop 
Two main points characterize the sudden stop literature. First, external factors exert a decisive 
influence on capital inflows into emerging markets. Second, depreciation results in 
contractionary output in emerging markets while it produces the traditional expansionist 
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effects in industrialized countries (Calvo and Reinhart, 2001). Indeed, exchange rate crises in 
emerging markets are followed by a sudden stop to capital inflows. These countries suffer 
from reserve losses and severe reversal in the current account deficit. Such reversal is based 
on a major decline in aggregates.  
In order to assess the relevance of the sudden stop literature, we determine what variables –
foreign or domestic, real or financial- exert the main influence on FOREX included in our 
VARs as a proxy of international capital flows. The theoretical prediction is that international 
financial shocks, here the EMBI shock- are the main variables influencing FOREX in our five 
countries. In addition, we analyze the influence of FOREX on other domestic variables. 
According to the sudden stop literature, a negative shock on FOREX must lead to a 
contraction in GDP. 
Interestingly, from the sudden stop literature standpoint, FOREX is influenced by 
international variables, and more specifically by financial variables. Thus, the international 
financial shock produces the expected effects when significant. An increase in the spread –
meaning degradation in the financial conditions for emerging countries- leads to a decrease in 
FOREX in Argentina and Brazil, and to a lesser extent in Chile after 3 quarters. Variance 
decompositions support the significant influence of EMBI on the behavior of FOREX. In 
Argentina, Brazil and Chile, EMBI innovations explain 15.4%; 8.2% and 7.8% of the FOREX 
variance. In the three countries, EMBI is its main explanatory variable. In addition, we find 
that FOREX does not respond to interest shocks. In other words, increasing the domestic 
interest rates is insufficient to favor the accumulation of international reserves. Such result is 
in accordance with the sudden stop literature that suggests that FOREX responds more to 
global shocks than domestic ones. 
FOREX shock generates few domestic fluctuations. This deceptive result does not necessarily 
contradict the sudden stop literature. Indeed, as stressed by Izquierdo et al. (2007), episodes of 
financial volatility tend to produce effects on real variables only in short-run. A plausible 
explanation is that the more significant effects of sudden stop on domestic variables are 
absorbed extremely rapidly, within one or two quarters. VAR models in level are not well-
equipped to detect these types of changes. Indeed, such models analyze the responses of 
macroeconomic variables to shocks of standard magnitude (usually one standard deviation), 
and not to unusual disturbances proper to crisis episodes. In addition, the main purpose of 
VAR models is not to identify crisis events. Crisis episodes are relevant only if they lead to 
structural breaks in the studied macroeconomic series. 
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Finally, we see that GDP decrease in the aftermath of the real depreciation. Three competing 
explanations are advanced in this paper. First, real depreciations may be synonymous of 
economic activity slowdown in the medium-term. This interpretation is not confirmed by the 
behavior of the FOREX variable. Indeed, while a negative response of FOREX to a real 
depreciation is expected –due to capital flows out- we observe in fact insignificant reactions 
of this variable. Real exchange rates innovations do not explain a significant share of FOREX 
variance in the five countries. Second, an alternative explanation of the negative relationship 
between GDP and real depreciations rests on the presence the presence of negative balance 
sheet effects. The inability to abroad in local currency –the so-called original sin- and the 
dollarization of the domestic economy can induce currency mismatch in the balance sheets of 
public and private agents. Using the degree of dollarization estimated by Reinhart, Rogoff and 
Savastano (2003), such explanation seems relevant only in Argentina and Uruguay10. Finally, 
a last explanation, most likely relevant in countries with low degrees of dollarization (Brazil, 
Chile and Mexico) suggests that the negative correlation between GDP and real exchange rate 
depreciations stems from shocks that induce both a real depreciation and a decline in GDP. 
Negative terms of trade shocks result in such negative correlation. 
Credibility matters 
Given the importance of inflationary history of numerous LACs, the responses of interest 
rates to innovations on consumption prices are particularly significant. Responses of interest 
rates are especially important to consider because they allow us to discriminate between 
credible and less credible countries. In Argentina and Chile, interest rates decrease or do not 
react after a CPI shock. In these two countries, inflation expectations are well anchored by the 
monetary regime in place in each country. Recall that from 1991 to 2001, Argentina had 
experienced a currency board arrangement while Chile had adopted an inflation targeting 
framework since 1991. In countries with soft pegs and a monetary policy not based on 
inflation targeting framework –as Brazil, Mexico and Uruguay- inflation expectations are 
imperfectly anchored. So, in such countries, shocks on prices induce higher fluctuations. 
Variance decompositions exhibit a clear picture. In Argentina and Chile, CPI innovations 
explain a mild or marginal share of the interest rates variances, respectively 8.7 and 0.2 
contemporaneously; and 12.8 and 1.8 after 16 quarters, while in Brazil the respective shares 
                                                 
10. According to the authors, Argentina and Brazil belong to Type I dollarization in which domestic and external 
liability dollarization co-exist; Uruguay is a dollarized economy of Type II where dollarization is predominantly 
of a domestic nature; and Chile and Mexico are Type III dollarization: the main part of debt in foreign currencies 
is external. Degrees of dollarization differ among our countries: high in Argentina (index 20 on a scale that goes 
from 0 to 30) and Uruguay (21), but weak in Brazil (7), Chile (7) and Mexico (5). 
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are 70.9% and 68.2%. In this latter country interest innovations explain only a weak share of 
the CPI variance (0% contemporaneously and 10.2% after 16 quarters). As expected, CPI 
shocks lead to real exchange rate appreciations. In comparison with countries enjoying an 
imperfect monetary credibility, the responses of the real exchange rate are short-lived in 
Argentina and Chile. 
3.4. Policy recommendations 
Previous results result in three main economic policy implications. First, from an optimal 
currency area perspective, our study shows that foreign variables engender a near-common 
business cycle in the region. Indeed, LACs tend to react similarly to same foreign shocks 
whatever the exchange rate regime. Contrary to several studies, we find that real channels 
seem as important as financial ones in explaining the influence of foreign variables on 
domestic ones in the majority of the studied LACs. Above all, we do not detect significant 
adverse asymmetric external shocks among our studies countries even if different degrees and 
types of dollarization imply that LACs are more or less sensitive to international financial 
shocks. In other words, most external shocks are common to LACs and characterize global 
shocks. As a result, putting the house in order is a necessary but not sufficient condition to 
avoid cyclical fluctuations due to global shocks. An important question is to determine to 
what extent a monetary union may insulate against such shocks. Using probit panel 
regressions to investigate whether countries forming a monetary union have a lower 
occurrence of sudden stop episodes and of current account reversal episodes, and whether 
they are better able to absorb external shocks, Edwards (2006) finds that belonging to a 
currency union has not lowered the probability of a sudden stop or a current account reversal, 
and external shocks have been amplified in currency union countries. 
From this perspective, a sustainable monetary union rests on mechanisms internalizing 
repercussions from such adverse shocks. On way is to favour more exchange rates flexibility 
in order to use them as shock absorber. Since 2002, LACs exhibit a clear shift to more flexible 
exchange rates. But this process may be unfavourable to economic and financial integration if 
it leads to higher bilateral exchange rates volatility. In order to improve the ability of LACs to 
cope with external shocks, economic policy coordination between them needs to be 
strengthened. The institutional framework for such purpose already exists. Indeed, the Treaty 
of Ouro Preto (2000) established a permanent structure dedicated to this coordination. Targets 
and procedures intended to allow the convergence of public deficit and the debt ratio were 
defined. A high-level macroeconomic Group of surveillance equivalent to the Ecofin council 
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in the European Union was created. In 2002 has been launched the project of the Monetary 
Institute for Mercosur. Clearly, policy coordination improves the ability of LACs to respond 
to external shocks, but coordination does not suffice. As, according to our results, global 
shocks are largely symmetric, LACs may create a regional monetary fund in order to use it in 
case of adverse external shocks. Such regional fund, already envisaged in East and South-East 
Asia, may function as a mutual insurance mechanism. 
A second policy implication refers to the question of the monetary policy credibility. Indeed, 
our estimates do not allow us to distinguish countries according to their exchange rate 
regimes. A better distinction to analyze the responses to similar shocks is based on the 
different degrees of credibility. As well-known, LACs have a long history of inflation 
resulting in fragile inflation expectations anchor. Since the beginning of 1990s, credibility 
gains have been impressive in LACs. The main point is that, as suggested by the endogenous 
OCA approach, differences in authorities’ credibility may represent an impediment to the 
convergence targets. To favor an economic policy convergence, it seems important that LACs 
adopt a similar anchor. Shock asymmetry between the LACs and the United States implies 
that the US dollar is not a good candidate. As a result, LACs need an alternative anchor to 
dollarization to avoid “the perennial misuse of monetary policy” by their central banks 
(Corbo, 2001: 246). Trade diversity from a geographic point of view may favor a peg to a 
common currency basket. But such peg lacks transparency. An alternative solution, suggested 
by Rose (2006), would be for LACs to adopt a similar inflation target in the conduct of their 
monetary policy. Brazil, Chile and Mexico have already adopted such monetary framework. 
Their central banks have benefited from inflation targeting to strengthen their credibility. 
Interestingly, all these countries have experienced better inflation performance than Argentina 
and Uruguay that have adopted a monetary aggregate target in the aftermath of their exchange 
rate regime collapse11.  
Finally, the lack of financial structure convergence -mainly due to different degrees and types 
of dollarization- is an additional factor explaining the slow economic policy convergence. 
Indeed, dollarized countries such as Argentina and Uruguay are especially sensitive to 
specific shocks limiting their ability to converge with Brazil from an economic policy point of 
view. From an economic policy standpoint, the development of domestic bonds markets must 
continue in order to reduce the currency mismatch and, then, the financial vulnerabilities of 
                                                 
11. In addition, recent Argentine and Uruguayan experiences suggest that the authorities of these two countries 
follow a de facto managed floating regime in which their exchange rates are confined within a very narrow 
range. As a consequence, these multiples objectives damage the credibility of their central banks leading to a 
slowdown of their inflation convergence towards Brazil and Mexico (the best performers). 
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LACs. Credibility gain may lead to a decrease in the dollarization degree in the region and 
favor the convergence of financial structure of these countries. Recall that dollarization 
remains high in Uruguay meaning that its financial vulnerabilities are still important. 
4. Concluding remarks 
Our results converge to indicate that LACs are influenced by foreign variables, either the real 
one for Brazil, Chile, and Mexico, or the financial one for Argentina and Uruguay. Our 
attempt to test the relevance of the sudden stop literature leads us to mixed conclusions. If our 
proxy of international capital inflows –the FOREX variables- is significantly explained by 
foreign financial variables, the analysis of domestic variable responses to FOREX shocks does 
not follow the predictions of common knowledge. 
We need to be cautious in the interpretation of our results. On the one hand, our analysis does 
not take into account the real convergence process. Camarero et al. (2006) study such process 
by considering productivity differences among Mercosur countries. Over the period 1960-
1999, the authors find the presence of a “Mercosur club” meaning a real convergence process. 
Regional integration has played a significant role in this process. As suggested by Camarero 
et al. (2006), real convergence raises the question of the level of the exchange rate chosen by 
each country at the entering date in the monetary union. Indeed, as most LACs know a 
catching-up process, their equilibrium exchange rates may change. On the other hand, our 
VAR models ignore regional interdependencies despite the fact that spillovers within the 
region exert a significant influence on the LACs’ business cycles. For instance, Uruguayan 
economic activity depends mainly on Argentine and Brazilian business cycles. In addition, 
some empirical studies suggest that financial markets interdependencies may explain 
exchange rates movements within the region12. 
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Appendix 1 Data and Sources 
 
Data Sources 
GDP Group of Seven OECD 
World commodities prices excluding oil IMF, International Financial Statistics 
EMBI Ministry of Economy and Production of the Republic of Argentina 
(http://www.mecon.gov.ar/peconomica/basehome/infoeco_ing.html) 
GDP  IPEA (http://www.ipea.gov.br) for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and 
Mexico 
Central Bank of the Republic of Uruguay 
Consumption Prices Index IMF, International Financial Statistics 
Foreign Exchange Reserves IMF, International Financial Statistics 
Money Market Interest Rates IMF, International Financial Statistics for Argentina, Brazil, 
Mexico, and Uruguay 
Central Bank of Chile for Chile 
Real Exchange rates IMF, International Financial Statistics for Chile and Uruguay 
Central Bank of Argentina for Argentina 
IPEA for Brazil 
OECD for Mexico 
 
 
Appendix 2 Exchange Rate Regimes in the Selected Latin American Countries 
 
 
 
Countries Year/Month Exchange rate regime Countries Year/Month Exchange rate regime 
Argentina 
1990-M1 Independently floating 
Brazil (cont.)
1998-M4 Forward-looking crawling peg 
 1991-M1 Horizontal band  1999-M1 Independently floating 
 1991-M3 Currency board 
Chile 
1990-M1 Backward-looking crawling peg
 2001M12 Managed floating  1998-M9 Forward-looking crawling peg 
 2004M11 Other tightly managed floating  1999-M9 Independently floating 
Brazil 
1990-M1 Backward-looking crawling peg
Mexico 
1990-M1 Forward-looking crawling peg 
 1990-M3 Managed floating  1994-M12 Independently floating 
 1991-M5 Backward-looking crawling peg
Uruguay 
1990_M1 Backward-looking crawling peg
 1994-M7 Tightly managed  1992_M1 Forward-looking crawling peg 
 1995-M3 Backward-looking crawling peg  2002-M6 Independently floating 
 
Source: from A. Bubula and I. Ötker-Robe’s Database. 
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Appendix 3: Structural breaks  
 
International Variables 
 
 
The Commodity Prices and the EMBI are both marked by a structural break from the last 
quarter of 2001, due to the simultaneity of a Commodity Prices hiking and a decrease of 
EMBI. 
 
Domestic Variables 
 
Argentina :  
Except the economic mayhem at the beginning of the 90s, the only structural break (intercepts 
and trends) comes from the exchange rate collapse of 2002. Attacks on Foreign Reserves are 
perceptible since 2001, with the unhooking of both the Foreign Reserves and the Interest 
Rate.  About one year later, it hits the Exchange Rate, the GDP and the CPI. 
Let us note in particular that the Tequila contagion (after the Mexican Crisis of 1994-95) is 
not obviously perceptible.  
Brazil:  
Two well known events are worthy of note: the Real Plan in 1994 and the currency crash of 
1998-99. But in 2002, the Argentinean crisis contagion and the political uncertainty of the 
presidential election weighted on the Exchange Rate. Except this point, we had to introduce a 
break for 1994 in the CPI, the Foreign Reserves, and the Interest Rate (but curiously neither 
for the real Exchange Rate nor the GDP). The 1998-1999 crisis hits significantly the 
Exchange Rate and the Foreign Reserves (but neither the CPI nor the interest rate).      
Chili: 
The Chilean economy is particularly sensible to international financial mayhem: so, the main 
break is due to the Asian Crisis, in 1997, hitting all the variables except the GDP. But the 
uncertainty following the Argentinean crisis is perceptible as much on the Exchange Rate as 
on the Interest Rate.  
Mexico: 
Obviously, the Currency Crash of 1994-95 hit all the real and nominal variables, beginning in 
the last quarter of 1994 with the Foreign Reserves, the Interest Rate, and then hurting the 
Exchange Rate, the CPI, and the GDP in 1995. 
Uruguay: 
The introduction of structural breaks in the case of Uruguay could be discussed. Although 
some shocks are obviously non-random ones, the high frequency of macro-fluctuations in the 
Uruguayan case turns break detection difficult. However, two shocks are clearly perceptible, 
with a break on the GDP (due to the Brazilian Currency Crash at the end of 1998) and a break 
on all the macroeconomic variables (except the CPI) after the Argentinean Crisis of 2002.   
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Appendix 4 Forecast Error Impulse Responses of One Standard Deviation (Innovations 
±2 SE) 
1- Are International Transmission Real or Financial? 
 
Figures display for each country the responses of GDP to GDPG7, WPNCO and EMBI 
shocks respectively. 
Argentina:            shocks  
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Chile:                     shocks  
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Uruguay:               shocks  
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2- Credibility matters 
 
Figures display for each country the responses of R and ER to CPI shocks respectively. 
Argentina:         Responses of  
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Uruguay :     Responses of  
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Appendix 5 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition for 16 periods, in percentage 
 
The results display the fraction of variance in a given variable (in %) after 16 quarters due to 
foreign and domestic shocks indicated in columns.  
 
Decomposition of Variance for Series GDP  
 LGDPG7 LWCPNO EMBI GDP CPI FOREX R ER 
Argentina 6.75 7.73 14.79 61.71 0.37 6.22 1.27 1.15 
Brazil 26.48 23.48 0.98 29.89 7.35 4.67 0.48 6.68 
Chile 5.26 39.04 1.57 31.86 11.22 2.91 4.31 3.85 
Mexico 3.16 7.79 5.12 60.18 4.75 1.06 5.73 12.22 
Uruguay 1.27 3.18 15.50 67.32 0.18 0.70 8.25 3.59 
 
 
Decomposition of Variance for Series CPI (Prices Indexes) 
 LGDPG7 LWCPNO EMBI GDP CPI FOREX R ER 
Argentina 11.28 12.88 2.43 14.91 36.05 16.62 4.96 0.87 
Brazil 8.44 4.07 2.77 6.60 64.12 1.53 10.20 2.27 
Chile 0.22 11.80 5.86 0.32 69.46 10.00 0.09 2.25 
Mexico 2.42 0.31 1.49 3.21 80.15 11.85 0.13 0.43 
Uruguay 16.01 31.10 10.04 6.46 21.63 1.04 9.05 4.68 
 
 
Decomposition of Variance for Series FOREX (Foreign Exchange) 
 LGDPG7 LWCPNO EMBI GDP CPI FOREX R ER 
Argentina 2.38 3.09 15.43 17.72 3.13 56.73 1.02 0.49 
Brazil 7.33 1.20 8.21 5.51 2.63 69.92 3.06 2.13 
Chile 1.11 0.71 7.79 0.29 3.72 85.67 0.58 0.12 
Mexico 5.23 10.76 0.63 2.42 14.99 61.79 3.02 1.15 
Uruguay 2.09 1.41 1.68 8.49 0.52 80.88 2.84 2.09 
 
 
Decomposition of Variance for Series R (Domestic Interest Rates) 
 LGDPG7 LWCPNO EMBI GDP CPI FOREX R ER 
Argentina 8.79 2.68 1.28 4.59 12.79 1.70 51.94 16.21 
Brazil 3.97 0.37 1.79 9.59 68.19 4.74 10.81 0.52 
Chile 12.33 4.32 21.37 4.29 1.84 3.85 51.75 0.25 
Mexico 6.59 4.44 6.98 6.46 21.35 8.24 44.31 1.63 
Uruguay 0.78 0.23 3.19 2.11 3.77 2.68 84.78 2.45 
 
 
Decomposition of Variance for Series ER (real exchange rates) 
 LGDPG7 LWCPNO EMBI GDP CPI FOREX R ER 
Argentina 2.98 15.99 1.29 21.42 12.86 9.24 8.80 27.41 
Brazil 8.88 2.22 7.57 3.65 5.38 3.39 6.59 62.31 
Chile 4.72 7.82 4.09 2.11 0.78 3.63 0.82 76.04 
Mexico 0.34 3.05 2.17 3.44 21.87 4.74 17.43 46.96 
Uruguay 8.12 2.55 13.32 15.14 7.84 8.02 1.88 43.13 
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